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CASE COMMENT
FEELING OUR WAY THROUGH THE CLEAN WATER ACT:
PRE-ENFORCEMENT JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE EPA
COMPLIANCE ORDERS UNDER SACKETT V.
ENVIRONMENTAL PR 0 TECTION AGENCY
Susan L. Stephens* & Miguel Collazo, III"*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Sackett v. EnvironmentalProtectionAgency, _

U.S.

_,

132 S.

Ct. 1367 (2012), U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito remarked, in
his concurring opinion, that "[tjhe reach of the Clean Water Act [the
CWA] is notoriously unclear." Indeed, since its enactment in 1972,
Congress has never defined what it meant by "the waters of the United
States," which both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) seek to protect under the
CWA. While the U.S. Supreme Court has had several opportunities over
the years to curb the EPA and the Corps' interpretation of the phrase
"waters of the United States" as an "essentially limitless grant of
authority," the "precise reach of the [CWA] remains unclear.",2 This
lack of clarity, and the factual scenario presented in Sackett, prompted
Justice Alito to call for Congress "to do what it should have done in the
first place: provide a reasonably clear rule regarding the reach of the
[CWA]" in order to "rectify the underlying problem." 3 While the
Sackett case has called EPA to task for putting ordinary American
property owners like Michael and Chantell Sackett (Sacketts) "at the
agency's mercy," in reality, the decision is unlikely to yield much in
terms of substantive changes to the EPA enforcement procedures. 4 The
Sackett majority kept its opinion deliberately narrow.

Esq., Shareholder, Hopping Green & Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida.
Esq., Shareholder, Hopping Green & Sams, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida.
1. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Sackett) (Alito, J., concurring); Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1972).
2. Id. (Alito, J., concurring); see also id. at 1370 (citing various U.S. Supreme Court
cases since 1985 addressing the scope of the CWA).
3. Id. at 1375-76 (Alito, J., concurring).
4. See generally id.
*

**
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II. BACKGROUND

The Sackets own a 0.63 acre lot near Priest Lake, Idaho, upon which
they intended to build their home. 5 Prior to purchasing it, the Sacketts
investigated the property, including its permitting history and applicable
regulatory requirements. 6 After they completed their due diligence
effort, the Sacketts were unaware, and had no reason to believe, that
their property contained wetlands regulated under the CWA. 7 After
obtaining all required local permits and beginning to build their new
home, the EPA issued the Sacketts a compliance order, which charged
them with violating the CWA by placing fill material on their lot. 8 On
its face, the compliance order was severe. 9 It suggested that the EPA
had already determined there to be violations of the CWA and as a
result, had imposed serious and costly sanctions on them.' 0 The
compliance order contained both prohibitive and mandatory features. 1 '
Specifically, it:
" Enjoined the Sacketts from the only authorized use of the
property under the law; 12
"

Revoked the Sacketts' fundamental right to exclude others
from their property; 13

*

Controlled the use of the Sacketts'
property even after
14
completion of the fill removal;

5. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, Sackett v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2011 WL
4500687, at *6 (Petitioners' Brief on the Merits); Brief for the Respondents, Sackett v. U.S.
EPA, 2011 WL 5908950, at *6 (Brieffor the Respondents); Sackett v. U.S. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139,
1145 (9th Cir. 2010) (EPA 11), cert. granted in part, 131 S. Ct. 3092 (U.S. 2011), and rev'd sub
nom., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (U.S. 2012).
6. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *6.
7. Id.
8. Sackett v. U.S. EPA, 2008 WL 3286801, at *1 (EPA 1); EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141;
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370.
9. Petitioners' Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *9.
10. Id. at *6; see also EPA 1, 2008 WL 3286801, at *1; EPA H, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett,
132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
11. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *7; see also EPA I, 2008 WL
3286801, at *1; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
12. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *7; see also EPA I, 2008 WL
3286801, at *1; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
13. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *7; see also EPA 1, 2008 WL
3286801, at *1; EPA 1, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
14. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *7; see also EPA 1,2008 WL
3286801, at *1; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
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*

Subjected the Sacketts' property, by virtue
compliance order's very existence, to a federal
that (1) prohibited the intended, authorized
required expensive remedial actions, substantially
the value of the property; and (3) limited the
ability to alienate the property; 15 and,

*

Imposed significant civil penalties
and threatened criminal
16
Sacketts.
the
upon
penalties

of the
mandate
use; (2)
reducing
Sacketts'

Obviously, the Sacketts could no longer continue to build their home
without incurring sanctions, even though they believed their property
did not include wetlands under the EPA's jurisdiction.' 7 They first tried
to resolve the compliance order informally, but the EPA refused to
address the Sacketts' jurisdictional arguments. 18 In the meantime, the
Sacketts were accruing civil penalties of up to $37,500 per day (and, as
explained later, an additional $37,500 per day, for a total of $75,000per
day) by not immediately complying with the order, which the CWA did
not explicitly permit the Sacketts to challenge "under the APA or
otherwise. '
II. U.S. DISTRICT COURT

Thus, in April 2008, the Sacketts filed suit in federal district court to
contest the jurisdictional basis for the order,20 asserting three claims:
*

The EPA does not have jurisdiction over the property, and
as a consequence the compliance order should be set aside
under the APA; 2

15. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *8; see also EPA 1, 2008 WL
3286801, at *1;EPA 11, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
16. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *8-*9; see also EPA 1,2008
WL 3286801, at *1; EPA II,622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370-71.
17. Petitioners'Briefonthe Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *9; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
18. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *9; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
19. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *8; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1370,
1372-73; Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006) (authorizing, in
706(2)(A), a reviewing court to set aside final agency action that is, among other things,
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law").
20. Petitioners' Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *9; EPA 1, 2008 WL 3286801,
at *1; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S.Ct. at 1371.
21. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *9-*10; EPA I,2008 WL
622F.3dat 1141;Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
3286801, at *1;EPA,
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The compliance order violates Sacketts' due process rights
because, before a person can be deprived of liberty or
property, he is entitled to a full and fair hearing "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"; 22 and,

" The compliance order violates Sacketts' due process rights
because a person cannot be punished
for conduct that
23
law.
vague"
"impermissibly
an
violates
After the Sacketts filed their complaint and the EPA issued an
amended compliance order, the EPA moved to dismiss the Sacketts'
action, contending that the compliance order was not subject to judicial
review under the APA, and that it did not violate due process. 24 In a
memorandum decision issued August 7, 2008, the district court granted
the EPA's motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked jurisidction to
adjudicate the Sacketts' APA and due process claims. In an order
issued October 9, 2008, the district court denied the Sacketts' motion
for clarification and reconsideration, concluding that its dismissal order
did not need clarification and that the Sacketts had not stated an
adequate basis for reconsideration.26

IV. NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
The Sacketts appealed the district court's order to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals. In a decision issued September 17, 2010 affirming
the district court's dismissal, the Ninth Circuit construed the CWA to
preclude judicial review of compliance orders like the one the EPA
issued to the Sacketts.28
29
The Ninth Circuit's decision consisted of a three-part analysis.
22. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *10 (citing Armstrong v.
Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)); EPA I, 2008 WL 3286801, at *1; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141;
Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
23. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *10 (citing Viii. of Hoffman
Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 497 (1982)); EPA 1, 2008 WL
3286801, at *1; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
24. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *10; EPA 1, 2008 WL
3286801, at *1; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
25. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *10; EPA I, 2008 WL

3286801, at *2-*3; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
26. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *10; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141.
27. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *10; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141;

Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
28. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *10-*11; EPA I, 622 F.3d at
1147; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
29. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *11; EPA II, 622 F.3d at 1141-
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First, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the compliance order was
agency action reviewable under the APA, in light of the fact that the
CWA neither expressly provides for, nor expressly precludes, the preenforcement judicial review of compliance orders.30- Acknowledging a
general presumption in federal case law that favors the judicial review
of administrative action, the Ninth Circuit engaged in an analysis that
relied upon three of the four factors (not including the express language
in the statute) set forth in Block v. Community Nutrition Institute, 467
U.S. 340, 351 (1984), for determining whether Congress intended to
preclude judicial review under the APA, which if established would
overcome this general presumption.3 ' Specifically, the court analyzed
the CWA's structure, purposes, and legislative history. 32 Based upon its
analysis, the Ninth Circuit concluded that a congressional intent to
preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of compliance orders was
"fairly discernible in the statutory scheme" of the CWA.3 3
Second, the Ninth Circuit cited to several judicial decisions from
other courts that have held that the CWA precludes review of preenforcement actions such as compliance orders, indicating that "[t]he
reasoning of these courts is persuasive to us, as well as the broad
uniformity of consensus on this issue."3 4 Even so, the court
acknowledged that a literal construction of the CWA's provisions could
in theory render it unconstitutional because it would deprive the
Sacketts of their due process right to meaningful judicial review of the
compliance order at a meaningful time. Specifically, the court cited the
Eleventh Circuit's 2003 construction of an analagous provision in the
Clean Air Act (CAA), wherein the Eleventh Circuit took issue with the
fact that the compliance order could be issued by the EPA "on the basis
of any information available" without any hearing, and that the CAA
made civil and criminal penalties dependent on violations of compliance
orders whether or not there was an actual violation of the CAA.35
Ultimately, the court refused to adopt a similarly literal interpretation of
the CWA's text, instead holding that if and when the EPA chooses to
enforce the compliance order in federal court, the Sacketts could raise a
jurisdictional defense at that time.36
Finally, the Ninth Circuit assessed whether forcing the Sacketts to
47.
30.
31.
32.
33.

EPA 11, 622 F.3d at 1142.
Id. at 1142-43.
Id.at 1143-44.
Id. at 1147.

34. Id. at 1143.

35. Id. at 1144-45 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Whitman, 336 F.3d 1236, 1256 (11th Cir.
2003)).
36. See id. at 1145-46.
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wait until the EPA brings an enforcement action would constitute a due
process violation, insofar as the Sacketts would risk accruing
"frightening penalties" by refusing to comply. 37 In support of its
analysis, the court applied the U.S. Supreme Court test in Thunder
Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,38 which held that the statutory preclusion of
pre-enforcement judicial review of administrative orders violates due
process only when "the practical effect of coercive penalties for
noncompliance [is] to foreclose all access to the courts so that
compliance is sufficiently onerous and coercive penalties sufficiently9
potent that a constitutionally intolerable choice might be presented.",3
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because the Sacketts could contest the
EPA's jurisdiction to issue a compliance order by applying for a permit
and seeking judicial review of the permit's denial, and because the
amount of any civil penalties sought by the EPA would be left to the
equitable discretion of a federal judge (not the EPA), it was "not
persuaded that the potential consequences from violating CWA
compliance orders are so onerous as to foreclose all access to the courts
and create a constitutionally intolerable choice. '4° Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that the CWA precludes APA review, and that
such preclusion does not violate the Sacketts' due process rights. 4"
V. U.S. SUPREME COURT

The Sacketts appealed the Ninth Circuit's decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court, which accepted jurisdiction on June 28, 2011, 42 to
"consider whether [the Sacketts] may bring a civil action under the
of an administrative
[APA] to challenge the issuance by the [EPA]
'43
compliance order under § 309 of the [CWA].
A. Briefs
In their Brief on the Merits, the Sacketts took issue with several
aspects of the Ninth Circuit's decision. Specifically, the Sacketts,
represented by Pacific Legal Foundation 44 argued that the Ninth Circuit:
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 1146.
Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1146-47 (internal quotations omitted).

41.

Id. at 1147.

42. Petitioners' Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *1; Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1371.
43. Sackett, 132 S. Ct. at 1369.
44. Established March 5, 1973, Pacific Legal Foundation is the "oldest and most
successful public interest legal organization that fights for limited government, property rights,
individual rights and a balanced approach to environmental protection."

See "About PLF," at
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"

Created a constitutional problem by reading the CWA
narrowly to preclude pre-enforcement judicial review of the
compliance order, because the Sacketts had been made
subject to penalties based upon alleged violations of the
compliance order even though the underlying violations of
the CWA had not been established.45

* Never considered, when assessing whether the CWA
statutorily precluded judicial review of administrative orders
under the APA, if contrary inferences might support the
conclusion that Congress did intend for individuals like the
46
Sacketts to obtain review under the APA.
"

Failed to consider one of the Block factors-whether the
"nature of the administrative action" (in this instance, the
compliance order) supported judicial review under the
APA-which was significant because the APA forbids the
imposition of sanctions (the nature of the action at issue)
unless an agency acts within its statutory jurisdiction and
authority in the first instance.47

*

Cited judicial decisions from other courts that have held that
the CWA precludes review of pre-enforcement actions such
as compliance orders, but that ignored, or addressed only
cursorily, the due process implications of denying judicial
review to individuals like the Sacketts.48

*

Reasoned that the Sacketts were not deprived of due process
because they could contest the EPA's jurisdiction to issue the
compliance order by applying for a permit and seeking
judicial review of the permit's denial, but did not explain the
manner in which the permitting process could provide review
of the compliance order, given that (1) review would be
limited to the permit denial or contested permit conditions;
and (2) the Sacketts are effectively precluded by regulation
from even applying for a permit until the compliance order is
resolved.49

http://www.pacificlegal.org (last accessed on June 9, 2012).
45. Petitioners'Brief on the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *10.
46. Id.
47. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 558(b).
48. Petitioners'Briefon the Merits, 2011 WL 4500687, at *12.
49. Id. at* 13.
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Did not address the Sacketts' contention that, under Thunder
Basin, the CWA permitting process is too onerous to provide
constitutionally adequate review because that process is
frequently ruinously expensive and time-consuming, and its
costs are not recoverable. 5 °

" Did not address the fact that if and when the EPA seeks civil
penalties for the Sacketts' failure to comply with the
compliance order, even a subsequent substantial "good faith"
reduction in liability by a federal judge sitting in equity
would still leave the Sacketts paying an immense civil
penalty (a 99% reduction to the statutory maximum for four
years of noncompliance would exceed $500,000).5
On the other hand, unsurprisingly, the EPA agreed with the Ninth
Circuit's analysis in its Brief on the Merits, citing with approval, the
court's determinations that:
" Every circuit that has confronted the issue has held that the
CWA impliedly precludes judicial review of compliance
orders until the EPA brings an enforcement action in federal
district court.52
" The CWA's structure, purposes, and history indicate that
Congress intended to foreclose the pre-enforcement review
of compliance orders because providing for the immediate
judicial review of such orders would "vitiate EPA's
statutorily-conferred discretion either to issue a compliance
'5
order or to file a Section 309(b) enforcement action.
" Construing the CWA to preclude the pre-enforcement
judicial review of compliance orders would not violate the
Sacketts' due process rights because (1) a district court
cannot assess penalties for violations of a compliance order
under Section 309(d) unless the EPA proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged violators
actually violated the CWA in the manner alleged; and (2)
such preclusion would violate due process "only when
compliance is so onerous, and the penalties for
50. Id.
51.

Id. at'*13-'14.

52. Brieffor the Respondents, 2011 WL 5908950, at *8.

53. Id. at *8-*9.

20121
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noncompliance so coercive, as to have the practical effect of
foreclosing access to the courts," which was not the case
here, because the Sacketts could have
54 sought judicial review
process.
permitting
CWA
the
under
The amount of any civil penalty imposed would be
determined by a federal district court, based upon factors
specified in the CWA, "only after the [Sacketts] have had a
full and55fair opportunity to present their case in a judicial
forum."

B. OralArguments
On January 9, 2012, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments.56
The toughest questions and comments were aimed at counsel for the
U.S. (EPA), Mr. Malcolm Stewart.
For example, Justice Alito asked Mr. Stewart whether "if [he] related
the facts of this case as they come to [the Court] to an ordinary
homeowner,5 57 and whether Mr. Stewart thought that "most ordinary
homeowners would say this kind of thing can't happen in the United
States?

'58

Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts asked what Mr. Stewart

would do if he had received the Sacketts' compliance order.59 When Mr.
Stewart responded that one could apply for an after-the-fact permit,
Chief Justice Roberts replied: "You wouldn't do that, right? You know
you will never get an after-the-fact permit if 60the EPA has sent you a
compliance order saying you've got wetlands."
Regarding the EPA's argument that the Sacketts could contest the
EPA's jurisdiction to issue a compliance order by applying for an afterthe-fact permit and seeking judicial review of the permit's denial,
Justice Kagan rhetorically asked the Sacketts' Counsel whether the
"critical" point was whether the EPA would even entertain such an
application while a compliance order was pending. 61 Moreover, Justice
Alito expressed the view that it "seem[ed] very strange.., for a party to
apply2 for a permit on - on the ground that they don't need a permit at
all."

,

54. Id. at *9.
55. Id. at *9*10 (internal citations omitted).
56. Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367 (2012), U.S. Supreme Court Official Transcript, Case
No. 10-1062, at 37 [hereinafter Official Transcript].

57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 36-37.

61. Id. at 12.
62. Id. at 14.
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When Mr. Stewart relayed the EPA's alternative solutioncomplying with the compliance order--Chief Justice Roberts's response
was incredulous: "That's what you would do? You would say: I don't
think there are wetlands on my property, but EPA does. So, I'm going
to take out all the fill; I'm going to plant herbaceous trees or whatever it
is; and
... that way, I'll just do what the government tells me I should
63
do?"

With respect to the finality of the compliance order for purposes of
judicial review, Justice Breyer remarked that:
[Flor 75 years the courts have interpreted statutes with an eye
towards permitting judicial review, not the opposite .... And yet
- so, here you're saying this statute that says nothing about it
precludes review, and then the second thing you say is that this
isn't final. So I read
the order. It looks like about as final a thing
64
seen.
ever
as I've
Additionally, Justice Ginsburg asked Mr. Stewart whether once the
EPA had made a determination that jurisdictional wetlands do exist on
the property, that determination brought the matter to a close from the
EPA's perspective. 6 5 Mr. Stewart responded, "I think they have reached
that conclusion for now. I don't think it would be accurate to say that
we have done all the research we would want to do if we were going to
be required to prove up our case in court." 66 This response drew ire
from Justice Alito:
That makes the EPA's conduct here even more outrageous: We -we think now that this is -- wetlands that -- that qualify; so we're
going to hit you with this compliance order, but, you know, when
we look into
it more thoroughly in the future, we might change
67
our mind?
C. Decision
The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision on March 21, 2012.68 It
concluded that "the compliance order in this case is final agency action
for which there is no adequate remedy other than APA review, and that

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 36-37.
Id.at51.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sackett, 312 S.Ct. at 1367.
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the [CWA] does not preclude that review." 69 It thus reversed the Ninth
Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.70
The Court first considered whether the compliance order was final
agency action.71 The Court concluded that it was final because it "ha[d]
all of the hallmarks of APA finality...." 72 Specifically, the Court found
that the compliance order "determined" the Sacketts' "rights or
obligations," because "[b]y reason of the order, the Sacketts have the
legal obligation to restore their property . . . and must give the EPA
access to their property and to records and documentation related to the
conditions at the Site."73 Additionally, the Court found that several
"legal consequences flow" from the EPA's issuance of the compliance
order to the Sacketts, such as the fact that the compliance order exposed
the Sacketts to double penalties in any future enforcement proceeding
and severely limited the Sacketts' ability to obtain a permit for their fill
from the Corps.74 The Court also determined that issuance of the
compliance order marked the consummation of the EPA's
decisionmaking process, notwithstanding the EPA's arguments to the
contrary (based upon language in the compliance order inviting
informal discussions regarding same), because "[t]he mere possibility
that an agency might reconsider [its compliance order] in light of
does not
informal discussion and invited contentions of inaccuracy
' 75
nonfinal.
action
agency
final
otherwise
an
make
to
suffice
Having concluded that the compliance order was indeed final agency
action, the Court next addressed whether the Sacketts had an "adequate
remedy in a court" other than pursuant to the APA.76 The Court
observed that in CWA enforcement cases, judicial review ordinarily
comes by way of a civil action brought by the EPA; but the Sacketts
could not initiate such a lawsuit, and while they waited for the EPA to
decide whether to do so they would continue to accrue significant
liability under the CWA. 7" The Court also found the CWA permitting
process to be an inadequate option, because "[t]he remedy for denial of
[an] action that might be sought from one agency [the Corps] does not
ordinarily provide an adequate remedy for action already taken by
another agency [EPA].'78
Finding the Sacketts' only real option for judicial review of the
69. Id. at 1374.
70. Id.
71.

Id. at 1371.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1371-72 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1372.
Id.
Id.
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EPA's pre-enforcement compliance order was to do so pursuant to the
APA, the Court next considered whether the CWA implicitly precludes
judicial review pursuant to the APA under the factors enunciated in
Block. 79 The Court was not persuaded by the EPA's arguments to the
contrary, including the EPA's contentions that the effectiveness of
compliance orders would be undermined if they were subjected to
judicial review, or that Congress viewed compliance orders as merely "a
step in the deliberative process." 80 The Court noted that even if
compliance orders were subject to judicial review, they would still be
useful because they nevertheless "provide a means of notifying
recipients of potential violations and quickly resolving the issues
through voluntary compliance[,]" particularly "in those many cases
81
where there is no susbtantial basis to question their validity."
Additionally, the Court explained that "[a]s the text (and indeed the
very name) of the compliance order makes clear, the EPA's deliberation
over whether the Sacketts are in violation of the [CWA] is at an end,"
because following issuance of the compliance order, the next step "will
either be taken by the Sacketts (if they comply with the order) or will
involve judicial, not administrative, deliberation (if the EPA brings an
enforcement action). 82 Accordingly, the Court found that the EPA had
not overcome the APA's presumption favoring judicial review of
administrative action based upon "inferences of intent drawn from the
statutory scheme as a83whole," and concluded that the CWA does not
preclude APA review.
VI. CONCLUSION

What does this mean going forward? How far does Sackett extend?
On its face, it applies only to enforcement actions brought under the
CWA, a point carefully made by the Court. s 4 But even the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that both the CWA and the CAA permit the EPA to issue
compliance orders "on the basis of any information available," and
contain enforcement provisions subjecting any person that violates a
compliance order to a civil penalty, suggesting at least that the CAA

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
(internal
84.

Id. at 1372-73.
Id.at 1373.
Id.at 1373-74 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.at 1373.
Id.at 1373-74 (citing Block v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345 (1984)
quotations omitted)).
"We conclude that the compliance order in this case is final agency action for which

there is no adequate remedy other than APA review, and that the Clean Water Act does not
preclude that review." Sackett, 312 S. Ct. at 1374 (emphasis added).

CASE COMMENT

could suffer from the same constitutional defects as the CWA.85 Thus,
CWA enforcement, may
its reach, while intended to affect only
8
reverberate in other enforcement contexts.
So what changes can we expect from the EPA? The Sackett decision
could prompt an overhaul of the EPA's enforcement procedures,
possibly the creation of a mechanism to provide for administrative
review of compliance orders. However, that is by no means a certain
outcome. As a practical matter, it might result simply in the EPA being
more cautious in how it words its enforcement orders-for example,
"compliance orders" may become "notices of violation" or orders to
"show cause," and indicate they are "non-final., 87 The nomenclature
may change, but the effect on ordinary citizens with limited resourcesthe feeling of being completely at the mercy of the EPA-would be
unlikely to change. Various sources have opined that the EPA will
simply need to "be sure of its facts" and jettison the cases on which its
enforcement case is shaky or be more judicious about pursuing
compliance orders against violators with deep pockets. However, one
can only hope that the EPA will take this opportunity to create a
meaningful opportunity for review of its compliance orders that affords
the due process that the Sacketts were denied.

85. Sackett v. U.S. EPA, 622 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted in part, 131
S. Ct. 3092 (U.S. 2011), and rev'd sub nom., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S.Ct. 1367 (U.S. 2012).
86. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2006) (CWA enforcement); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (2006) (CAA
enforcement); 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (2006) (RCRA enforcement). Like the CWA, neither the CAA
nor the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) contain express provisions
prohibiting pre-enforcement judicial review, and contain many other similar if not identical
provisions.
87. See Bridget DiCosmo, Downplaying High CourtRuling, EPA Floats Optionsfor CWA
Enforcement, INSIDEEPA.coM (Aug. 2, 2012), http://insideepa.com/Inside-EPA-General/lnsideEPA-Public-Content/downplaying-high-court-ruling-epa-floats-options-for-cwa-enforcement/m
enu-id-565.html (noting that the potential options the agency is considering include greater use
of "notice of violation" (NOV) letters (like those used in the CAA office) and "show cause"
letters (like those used in the RCRA office), which are not eligible for judicial review.

270

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LA WAND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 23

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

JOURNAL OF LAW
AND PUBLIC POLICY

ARTICLES
A FRESH

CUT IN AN OLD WOUND-A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE TRAYVON MARTIN KILLING: THE
PUBLIC OUTCRY, THE PROSECUTORS' DISCRETION, AND
THE STAND YOUR GROUND LAW
STATE STANDING TO CHALLENGE ULTRA VIRES FEDERAL
ACTION: THE HEALTH CARE CASES AND BEYOND
THE ROBERTS COURT: USING THE TAXING POWER TO
SHAPE INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW AND CPAs:
LAW OF THE LAWYERS, BY THE LAWYERS,

Tamara F Lawson

Timothy Sandefur
Mystica M Alexander
& Timothy Gagnon

A

FOR THE LAWYERS

Adam J. Smith

ESSAY
CHOOSING AMONG INNOCENTS: SHOULD DONATIONS TO
CHARITIES BE PROTECTED FROM AVOIDANCE AS
FRAUDULENT TRANSFERS?

Jeffrey Davis

NOTE
DODD-FRANK: FRANKLY AN INEFFICIENT FORM OF
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

[:VOLUME 23

DECEMBER

2012

Matthew H. Nemeroff

NUMBER

31

University of Florida
Journal of Law and Public Policy
VOLUME23

DECEMBER 2012

NUMBER 3

Editorial Board
Executive Research Editors
CHRISTINE BUSTAMANTE
TAMAR SOROKER
ALLISON SYMULEVICH
KELSEY VEITENGRUBER

Executive Articles Editors
Editor-in-Chief
WILLIAM STEIN
ManagingEditor
LAUREN WOODRUFF

Faculty Advisor
TERESA J. REID

Student Works Editor
NICOLE CRITELLI

SAMANTHA AYLWARD
SAMANTHA CULP
TYLER HUDSON
PHILIP ROSSMAN REICH
Staff Editor
VICTORIA A. REDD

Senior Editorial Board
Senior Research Editors

Assistant Editor-in-Chief

Senior Articles Editors

TAMARAH LEE
ALEXANDREA HITSON
LAUREN JANUZZI
KYLE JENSEN

KARA CARNLEY MURRHEE

SCOTr HYMAN
CHRISTINA CACCHIO
BRANDON MEADOWS
RACIEL PEREZ

ProductionsChair

Assistant Student Works Editor

NICOLE BAYER

ZACHARY ULLMAN

Alumni/FundraisingChair
KYLE HORTH

Notes Chair
AMY LIMONTES

Policy Chair
BEN SCHOTT

Bylaws Chair
ALEXANDRA MICHELINI

Assistant ManagingEditor
SUZANNE TzUANOS

Community Affairs Chair

FundraisingChair
JUSTIN YORK

MATTHEW FREY

General Board
KATHERINE ARTMAN
AMANDA AYERS
CHELSEA BRADEN
PAYDON BROEDER
DANIEL CHATLOS
JESSICA CLEMENTS
DREW CUNNINGHAM
CHARLES DELPAPA
ARIELLE EISENBERG
MARISSA FALLICA
ALFREDO FERRER
ERIC FISHER
KRISTINA GANDRE

ALEXANDRA GARDNER
STEPHANIE GENEROTTI
KRISTINA GONZALEZ
HEATHER GRIFFIN
SARA HEUER
RYAN HOPPER
MEREDITH HOUGH
SARAH JECK
ALEX KRUZYK
ALEXIS LEVENTHAL
BENJAMIN LICHTER
MEGAN MARLOWE

CHRISTOPHER MARTINEZ
CHRISTINA MASTRUCCI
MORGAN MCDONOUGH
KEVIN MILLER
STEPHANIE MONCADA
MATT NEMEROFF
ARMANDO NOZZOLILLO
KARINA RODRIGUEZ
MISCHAEL SACHMOROV
BENJAMIN SHIEKMAN
KATHERINE THOMASON
OLGA VELEZ

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The University of FloridaJournalof Law andPublic Policy is an
interdisciplinary organization whose primary purpose is the publication
of scholarly articles on contemporary legal and social issues facing
public policy decisionmakers. The Journal is composed of two
governing bodies: the Advisory Board and the Executive Board. The
Advisory Board is comprised of faculty and honorary members who
provide independent guidance. The Executive Board, which includes
both law and graduate students, is responsible for researching and
preparing each volume for publication. The Executive Board also selects
the articles that are published. All student members must complete a
writing requirement and help research and prepare the Journal for
publication.

The Journal thanks Marjorie A. Niblack and the Office of
Instructional Resources, University of Florida, for the use of the Century
Tower graphic on the back cover.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT
This issue of the University of Florida Journal of Law and
Public Policy is a direct result of the collaboration and hard work of the
Journalmembers, staff, advisors, sponsors, and contributing authors.
The Journal extends its deep appreciation for the generosity of
the University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law and the Huber
C. Hurst Fund in supporting and assisting the Journal in its publication
of this issue and for supporting our multidisciplinary journal concept.
Special thanks to our faculty advisor, Teresa J. Reid, and our
staff editor, Victoria A. Redd.

Please visit us on the web at www.law.ufl.edu under News
and Publications
The University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy
(ISSN# 1047-8035) is published three times per year and is sponsored
by the Warrington College of Business Administration and the Levin
College of Law, University of Florida. Printed by Western Newspaper
Publishing Co., Indianapolis, IN.
Editorial and Business Address: Fredric G. Levin College of Law,
University of Florida, P.O. Box 117636, 351 Village Dr., 218 BrutonGeer Hall, Gainesville, FL 32611. Phone: (352) 273-0906. Email Address:
jlpp@law.ufl.edu.
Subscriptions: $55.00 U.S. domestic per volume plus sales tax
for Florida residents and $60.00 U.S. international. Single issues are
available for $20.00 U.S. domestic and $25.00 U.S. international.
© 2012 University of FloridaJournalof Law and PublicPolicy.

